Copyright law is fundamentally designed to protect the rights of creators over their original works. However, disputes often arise regarding ownership, authorship, or errors in registration. In such cases, the question emerges: can a person rely on third party rights to seek rectification of copyright records? This issue sits at the intersection of procedural law, intellectual property rights, and principles of equity. This article explores whether and to what extent third-party interests can justify rectification of copyright entries. The answer lies in interpreting the scope of statutory provisions and judicial precedents.
Statutory Framework
The power to rectify the Register of Copyrights is provided under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957. It empowers the competent authority to:
- Correct errors or omissions
- Expunge entries wrongly made
- Insert or modify necessary particulars
Importantly, the provision allows “any person aggrieved” to apply for rectification. The Act does not narrowly define this phrase, leaving its interpretation to judicial development.
“MYA” Artistic Work Case
In Mohd Shakir v. Gopal Traders and Anr. (C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 699/2022), The Delhi High Court dismissed a petition filed under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957, seeking rectification of the copyright register in respect of the artistic work titled “MYA.” The petitioner challenged the registration on the ground that the work lacked originality and was allegedly derived from a third party’s prior mark with international registrations.
The case raised significant questions regarding the scope of “person aggrieved” and the extent to which third party rights may be relied upon in rectification proceedings. While the Court held that the petitioner qualified as an “aggrieved person” due to infringement proceedings initiated against it and an FIR has been filed, the petition was ultimately dismissed as the petitioner failed to establish that the entry in the register was wrongly made, particularly in the absence of the third party whose rights were being relied upon and due to lack of cogent evidence proving authorship.
Brief Facts Of The Case
The dispute before the Delhi High Court concerned a petition filed under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957, seeking cancellation of a registered artistic work on the ground that it lacked originality and was derived from a third party’s prior mark.
Arguments By The Petitioner
The petitioner’s core argument is that respondent no.1’s copyrighted work is not original but copied from the prior works of a third party, Mr. Youssef Anis Mehio and Mya International, who had registered the device mark ‘MYA’ in multiple countries since 2005. The petitioner claims that the third party’s prior trademarks in Classes 18 and 34, along with their Indian applications from 2006, demonstrate prior authorship or ownership, and that respondent no.1 cannot claim originality. The petitioner also contends that no notice of respondent no.1’s copyright application was served to the third party, who had a legitimate interest in the work.
Further, the petitioner emphasizes that copyright protection is international under the Berne Convention, unlike territorial trademark rights, and that respondent no.1’s existing trademark registrations do not prove originality. Since a criminal complaint was filed against the petitioner for alleged infringement, he qualifies as an “aggrieved person” under Section 50(b) and can seek rectification to expunge the allegedly wrongful copyright registration. The petitioner relies on Sections 13 and 17 of the Copyright Act to argue that copyright belongs to the true author, which, according to him, is not respondent no.1.
Arguments By The Respondent
The respondent, however, argued that the petition was not maintainable because the petitioner lacked locus and was not an “aggrieved person.” They stated that respondent no.1 had applied for copyright registration in accordance with Section 45 proviso of the Act, and the Registrar, after conducting a detailed examination, found no identical or deceptively similar mark on record. Consequently, the artistic work was duly registered in respondent no.1’s name. Counsel further highlighted that the petitioner had previously filed oppositions against the third party’s trademark applications, claiming themselves as the originator and owner of the artistic work titled ‘THE MYA,’ which estopped them from now asserting that the third party was the true author.
It was also contended that respondent no.1 had been using the mark ‘MYA’ and related marks since 2010, while the petitioner only adopted it in 2019, acknowledging respondent no.1 as the earlier adopter. The third party is not a party to the proceedings, and the petitioner was essentially acting on their behalf.
Court’s Findings
The court held that while the petitioner qualified as a “person aggrieved” due to the FIR filed by respondent no.1, they failed to prove that the copyright entry was “wrongly made.” Reliance on third-party trademark& copyright registrations was insufficient, as the third party was not before the court, and only the actual owner can assert copyright rights.
The Registrar had followed proper procedure under Section 45, confirming no identical or deceptively similar mark existed, leading to the valid registration of respondent no.1’s copyright. Additionally, the petitioner’s prior claims of authorship or ownership in trademark oppositions contradicted their current stance. Consequently, the rectification petition was dismissed, and pending applications were rendered infructuous.
The court also addressed the Berne Convention claim, noting that it did not help the petitioner. The Convention ensures international copyright protection for the actual author, but the petitioner was relying on a third party’s rights without that party being before the court. Only the true author could assert copyright under the Convention, so the petitioner could not use it to challenge respondent no.1’s registration.
Conclusion
The “MYA” case makes it clear that a person cannot rely solely on third party rights to seek rectification of the copyright register. While an individual may qualify as a “person aggrieved” if facing infringement proceedings, rectification under Section 50 requires proof that an entry was wrongly made, supported by direct evidence. Claims based on another party’s prior trademarks, copyrights or international registrations are insufficient if that party is not before the court and has not asserted their own rights.
This underscores that rectification is designed to correct genuine errors, not to resolve disputes based on presumed or absent third-party claims. Only the actual author or rights holder can challenge or assert copyright, and intermediaries cannot stand in their place even under the Berne Convention. Thus, reliance on third party rights alone cannot justify rectification of copyright entries.
Link to similar articles:https://jpassociates.co.in/ani-v-openai-copyright-law/
Link to the complete judgement: Mohd Shakir vs Gopal Traders