Contempt by a Tenant Who Fails to Vacate: Directions to Deliver Possession Immediately with Police Help

Eviction cases in India can take years. Suppose a landlord finally wins, and the tenant’s last appeal is dismissed by the Supreme Court. The tenant then asks for a few months to find another place. Courts often agree, but usually on one condition: the tenant must file a written promise, known as an “undertaking”, that he will hand over the premises by a fixed date. This article looks at whether a tenant who does not vacate the premises by that date can face contempt of court, and what else the court may do.

In a series of decisions spread over more than three decades, the Supreme Court has treated such a situation seriously. In several cases it has held the tenant to be in contempt of court and has also directed that possession be handed over at once, with police help if needed. In other cases, it has warned that contempt powers should not be used as a shortcut for ordinary enforcement of a decree. The discussion below looks at both lines of cases and at how they might fit together. It reflects one reading of the decisions; the outcome in any given case is likely to depend on its facts and on the exact terms of the court’s order.

A Few Terms Explained

Some legal terms come up repeatedly in these cases. An “eviction decree” is the court’s final order that the tenant must vacate. “Execution” is the ordinary process of enforcing that decree through the trial court, which can take time. “Contempt of court” covers conduct that disobeys or undermines a court’s authority. Under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, “civil contempt” means wilful disobedience of a court’s judgment, decree or order, or “wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court”. The word “wilful” matters: courts have generally looked for a deliberate breach, not an accidental or unavoidable one. A person found to have committed contempt is called a “contemnor” (sometimes spelt “contemner”). An “injunction” is a court order telling a person to do, or more often not to do, something. “Mesne profits” are, broadly, compensation payable for occupying property after the right to occupy has ended.

What Is the “Usual Undertaking” to Vacate?

When the Supreme Court grants time to vacate “subject to the usual undertaking”, it has a fairly settled form in mind. In Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar v. Kalu Ram, AIR 1989 SC 2285, the Court described it as a statement that the person giving it is in possession of the premises and will deliver vacant and peaceful possession to the landlord when the time runs out. The tenant thus gets extra time in exchange for a formal promise to the court.

Two related points emerge from the cases. In R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, (1992) 4 SCC 683, the Court held that a tenant who files the undertaking and enjoys the extra time cannot later challenge the eviction order, because the law does not allow a person to accept the benefit of an order and then dispute it. And in Thacker Hariram Motiram v. Balkrishan Chatrabhu Thacker, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 655, where the written undertaking filed did not match what had been promised orally, the Court withdrew the protection and directed possession to be given at once.

When Breaking the Undertaking Has Been Treated as Contempt: Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K.M.M. Shetty

The case most often cited on this subject is Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K.M.M. Shetty, (1990) 1 SCC 259 : AIR 1990 SC 464, decided on 20 December 1989. The tenant ran a hotel in Thane. After losing his appeal, he was allowed to stay until 31 March 1989, on condition that he and the seventeen people working and living in the premises filed undertakings to leave by that date and kept paying mesne profits. They filed the undertakings. Early in 1989, however, an outsider filed a fresh suit claiming to be in possession in his own right, and in April 1989 obtained an order from a local court stopping the eviction. The landlord went back to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court did not accept the tenant’s new claim that he had not been in possession when he gave the undertaking. It explained that when a court accepts an undertaking and acts on it, the undertaking works much like a court order (in the Court’s words, “in substance … an injunction”), and breaking it is “misconduct amounting to contempt”. The Court found the tenant guilty and fined him Rs 500. It also said that a fine or imprisonment alone “will not meet the ends of justice”. It therefore directed the District Magistrate, Thane to evict everyone in physical possession, including the outsider, “if necessary with police help”, and to hand vacant possession to the landlord immediately.

A few months later, a three-Judge Bench followed a similar course in Roshan Sam Boyce v. B.R. Cotton Mills Ltd., (1990) 2 SCC 636, where a company had broken its undertaking not to part with possession. The Court held the company guilty of contempt and directed the Court Receiver (an officer appointed by the court to hold and manage property in dispute) to take possession with police assistance.

What If the Tenant Never Filed the Undertaking?

Sometimes a tenant obtains time on the basis that an undertaking will be filed, and then simply does not file it. The tenant may later argue that, since there is no undertaking, there is nothing to breach. The Supreme Court has dealt with this argument in several cases, and its approach has been to look at the practical result rather than the technical point.

In Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar, the Court accepted that no undertaking had actually been filed, so the tenant could not be punished for breaking one. This was consistent with Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin, (1980) 3 SCC 47, which held that a court should not assume an undertaking that does not exist. But the Court also said that a party who had obtained six months’ time by misleading the court should not be allowed to defeat the order, and it directed the trial court to hand over possession, with police help if necessary.

Later decisions followed a similar path. In Ram Pyari v. Jagdish Lal, (1992) 1 SCC 157, the landlord complained that the tenant had neither filed the undertaking, nor paid arrears, nor vacated. The Court did not accept that the landlord’s only option was the slower route of execution, observing (quoting Firm Ganpat Ram) that “no court should allow any party to mislead the court and thereby frustrate its order”. It directed the trial court to deliver possession, with police help if needed. Zahurul Islam v. Abul Kalam, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 464 reached a similar result where other people had filed suits, alleged to be collusive (that is, filed in league with the tenant), to stall the eviction.

Santanu Chaudhuri v. Subir Ghosh, (2007) 10 SCC 253

In Santanu Chaudhuri v. Subir Ghosh, decided on 24 July 2007, the tenant had been given time until 31 August 2006 “subject to filing the usual affidavit by way of undertaking”, but filed nothing and stayed on. He argued that there was no undertaking to disobey, and that contempt should not be used to enforce a decree. The Court treated the case as covered by Firm Ganpat Ram, Ram Pyari and Zahurul Islam. It directed the trial court to deliver possession to the landlord “by eviction of the respondent … or anybody else found in occupation of the premises, if necessary, with the help of police, within one month”, awarded the landlord Rs 50,000 as costs, and left him free to claim rent and mesne profits.

The Court in Santanu Chaudhuri did not record a formal finding that the tenant was guilty of contempt. The direction to hand over possession appears to rest on the Court’s power to ensure that its own orders are not defeated. A similar approach was taken in Central Bank of India v. NRC Ltd., (2014) 13 SCC 291, where an occupier who had neither filed the undertaking nor paid occupation charges was held to have no right to stay, and the landlord was permitted to take back possession with police help if required.

Where Does the Power to Direct Police Help Come From?

A five-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court touched on this in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409. It observed that a breach of an undertaking can be dealt with by means other than sending someone to prison, giving the example of an undertaking “to deliver possession of property in a landlord-tenant dispute”. In such a case, it said, the court “may direct the police force to be utilised for recovery of possession and burden the contemner with costs”. The Bench explained that the purpose of the coercive power in civil contempt is partly to help the person who obtained the order actually receive its benefit.

Recent Decisions: Imprisonment, Fines and Possession with Police Help

Some recent orders suggest that the Supreme Court has become less willing to tolerate delay. In M/s Sitaram Enterprises v. Prithviraj Vardichand Jain, 2024 INSC 685, decided on 9 September 2024, a tenant who had been given time on an undertaking did not vacate and relied on pending curative petitions (a last-resort petition to the Supreme Court after review). The Court held him guilty of contempt, did not accept the pending petitions as a reason for non-compliance, sentenced him to imprisonment till the rising of the Court (detention in court until the judges rose for the day), and directed that if he did not leave within a week, possession would be taken with police help in the presence of a Court Commissioner (a person appointed by the court to carry out a task on its behalf), at his cost.

In Laxmi Construction v. Harsh Goyal, decided on 26 September 2025, the tenants had undertaken to vacate by 31 March 2025 but then obtained a “recall” order from the rent authority without the landlord being heard. The Court held them guilty. One was sentenced to three months in civil prison and fined Rs 1 lakh; the other, aged 82, was fined Rs 5 lakh instead of being imprisoned. The District Judge, Saharanpur was directed to deliver possession with police help within two weeks (news report). In Jayakandammal v. A. Selvaraju (order dated 19 September 2025), where the tenant had neither filed the undertaking nor vacated, the Court directed the local court to take possession with police assistance and fixed monthly occupation charges in the meantime.

General Contempt Principles That May Be Relevant

Israr Ahmad Khan v. Amarnath Prasad, 2026 INSC 209

Israr Ahmad Khan v. Amarnath Prasad, decided on 24 February 2026, is not a tenancy case. It concerned State officers who had not complied with a Supreme Court order in a service matter (a dispute about government employment). Some of the principles it restates may, however, be relevant to tenants who delay handing over possession.

• Filing a review petition (a request to the same court to reconsider its decision) did not, in the Court’s view, excuse non-compliance: “it was not open to the alleged contemnors to not comply with an Order of this Court on the mere filing of a Review Petition”.
• Following Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV, (2006) 1 SCC 613, the Court said the contempt court looks only at whether the order was obeyed, not at whether it was right: “Right or wrong, the order has to be obeyed”.
• A party who finds an order impossible or impractical to obey is expected to go back to the court promptly and ask for it to be changed, rather than simply not complying.
• Relying on the three-Judge Bench decision in Sita Ram v. Balbir, (2017) 2 SCC 463, the Court said that a person who knowingly helps another to disobey an order is liable even if he was not a party to the original case.

In the tenancy setting, these principles could be relevant where a tenant points to a pending appeal, argues that the eviction order was wrong, or has let a relative or third party into the premises. How much weight they carry in a particular case may depend on the facts and on whether the court sees the conduct as deliberate.

Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari v. Hiralal Somabhai Contractor, 2023 INSC 805

Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari v. Hiralal Somabhai Contractor, decided on 6 September 2023, is a land case, not a tenancy case. A lawyer had stated to the Gujarat High Court, on his clients’ instructions, that a property would not be sold; it was then sold through thirteen sale deeds. The Supreme Court held that such a statement by a lawyer counts as an undertaking to the court and that breaking it wilfully is civil contempt. It upheld the High Court’s decision to treat the sales as void, held that the buyers did not have a right to be heard in the contempt case, and said that an apology “should not be accepted as a matter of course”. These points could matter in tenancy disputes too, for example where a tenant says the undertaking was given by his lawyer, or where the premises have been sub-let in breach of it.

The Other Side: Contempt Is Not a Substitute for Execution

The Supreme Court has also cautioned against using contempt too readily. In R.N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik, (2000) 4 SCC 400, it said that the “weapon of contempt is not to be used in abundance or misused” and that normally it “cannot be used for execution of the decree or implementation of an order for which alternative remedy in law is provided for”. In Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, (2002) 5 SCC 352, it held that a court hearing a contempt case cannot add new directions to the original order. In Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi, (2012) 4 SCC 307, a civil suit had been decided on the basis of a party’s statement. The Court held that the resulting decree should be enforced through execution under Order XXI Rule 32 CPC rather than through contempt. It also noted that breaking an undertaking given to a court “amounts to contempt in the same way as a breach of injunction”.

In Rita Markandey v. Surjit Singh Arora, (1996) 6 SCC 14, the Court observed that if a party “gives an undertaking to the Court to vacate the premises … and there is a clear and deliberate breach thereof it amounts to civil contempt”. On the facts, though, it found no civil contempt, because the order had only recorded what the parties had agreed between themselves rather than a promise made to the court. (The tenant was punished separately for filing false affidavits.)

How do these cases fit with Noorali and Santanu Chaudhuri? One possible reading is this. Where a tenant obtains extra time from the Supreme Court or a High Court by giving, or promising to give, an undertaking to that court, the court has tended to enforce its own order directly, including by directing possession with police help; Santanu Chaudhuri itself distinguished R.N. Dey on this basis. Where the complaint is simply that a trial court’s decree has not been obeyed, or that the parties’ own settlement has been broken, the courts have generally pointed the landlord towards execution. The line between the two is not always sharp, and the wording of the particular order may make a significant difference.

Points a Landlord May Wish to Consider

Every case turns on its own order and facts, but the decisions above suggest a few things that may be worth keeping in mind. It may help to check that the order granting time clearly says it is subject to an undertaking, and that the undertaking actually filed matches what the court was told (the problem in Thacker Hariram Motiram). If the deadline passes, the application is usually made to the court that granted the time, and Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act generally requires contempt proceedings to be started within one year, although continued occupation has been treated as a continuing wrong.

In the cases discussed, the relief that proved effective was usually a specific direction to deliver possession, with police help if needed and within a fixed time, together with costs and liberty to claim mesne profits. Asking for such a direction, rather than only for punishment, may be worth considering. Where someone other than the tenant is in occupation, the decisions in Noorali, Santanu Chaudhuri and Sita Ram suggest that it may help to make that person a party to the contempt proceedings.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decisions from Noorali Babul Thanewala (1989) to Sitaram Enterprises (2024) and Laxmi Construction (2025) suggest that the Court regards a tenant’s failure to honour an undertaking to vacate as a serious matter, and that its usual response has been not just to punish but to ensure that possession is actually handed over, sometimes with police help. Cases such as Firm Ganpat Ram and Santanu Chaudhuri indicate that a tenant who obtains time by promising an undertaking may not be able to rely on his own failure to file it. At the same time, R.N. Dey, Jhareswar Prasad Paul and Kanwar Singh Saini show that contempt is not meant to replace ordinary execution. In the cases so far, the choice between the two approaches has turned largely on the wording of the order and on whether the tenant’s default looked deliberate.

This article is for general information only and is not legal advice. The position may vary with the facts of a case and with later decisions; readers should consult counsel on their particular situation.

References (with links to the judgments)

1. Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K.M.M. Shetty, (1990) 1 SCC 259 : AIR 1990 SC 464, Supreme Court, judgment dated 20 December 1989
2. (Mrs.) Roshan Sam Boyce v. B.R. Cotton Mills Ltd., (1990) 2 SCC 636 : AIR 1990 SC 1881, Supreme Court (three-Judge Bench), judgment dated 6 April 1990
3. Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar v. Kalu Ram, AIR 1989 SC 2285, Supreme Court, judgment dated 22 September 1989
4. Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin, (1980) 3 SCC 47 : AIR 1979 SC 1528, Supreme Court, judgment dated 12 April 1979
5. Thacker Hariram Motiram v. Balkrishan Chatrabhu Thacker, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 655, Supreme Court, judgment dated 25 April 1988
6. Ram Pyari v. Jagdish Lal, (1992) 1 SCC 157 : AIR 1992 SC 1537, Supreme Court, judgment dated 5 December 1991
7. N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, (1992) 4 SCC 683, Supreme Court, judgment dated 23 October 1992
8. Zahurul Islam v. Abul Kalam, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 464 : AIR 1994 SC 1403, Supreme Court, judgment dated 23 November 1993
9. Rita Markandey v. Surjit Singh Arora, (1996) 6 SCC 14 : AIR 1997 SC 2174, Supreme Court, judgment dated 27 September 1996
10. Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 : AIR 1998 SC 1895, Supreme Court (Constitution Bench), judgment dated 17 April 1998
11. N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik, (2000) 4 SCC 400, Supreme Court, judgment dated 19 April 2000
12. Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, (2002) 5 SCC 352 : AIR 2002 SC 2215, Supreme Court, judgment dated 8 May 2002
13. Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV, (2006) 1 SCC 613, Supreme Court, judgment dated 10 January 2006
14. Santanu Chaudhuri v. Subir Ghosh, (2007) 10 SCC 253, Contempt Petition (C) No. 249 of 2006 in SLP (C) No. 21766 of 2005, Supreme Court, judgment dated 24 July 2007 — PDF
15. Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi, (2012) 4 SCC 307, Supreme Court, judgment dated 23 September 2011
16. Central Bank of India v. NRC Ltd., (2014) 13 SCC 291, Supreme Court, judgment dated 5 March 2014
17. Sita Ram v. Balbir, (2017) 2 SCC 463, Supreme Court (three-Judge Bench), judgment dated 15 December 2016
18. Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari v. Hiralal Somabhai Contractor, 2023 INSC 805 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1139, Supreme Court, judgment dated 6 September 2023 — official PDF
19. M/s Sitaram Enterprises v. Prithviraj Vardichand Jain, 2024 INSC 685, Contempt Petition (C) Nos. 196-199 of 2024, Supreme Court, judgment dated 9 September 2024 — official PDF
20. Jayakandammal v. A. Selvaraju, Contempt Petition (C) No. 44 of 2025 in SLP (C) No. 13281 of 2023, Supreme Court, order dated 19 September 2025 (report)
21. Laxmi Construction v. Harsh Goyal, Contempt Petition (C) No. 218 of 2025 in SLP (C) No. 21177 of 2024, Supreme Court, judgment dated 26 September 2025 (case summary) — news report
22. Israr Ahmad Khan v. Amarnath Prasad, 2026 INSC 209, Contempt Petition (C) Nos. 5 and 6 of 2026, Supreme Court, judgment dated 24 February 2026
23. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Sections 2(b) and 20; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXI Rule 32.

Link to smilar articles: https://jpassociates.co.in/bona-fide-mistake-vs-false-statement-perjury-contempt/