Writ Petition Against a Private Bank for a Contractual Claim: Why It Is Usually Not Maintainable under Article 226

Suppose a borrower repays a home loan in full, but the private bank does not hand back the original property papers. Or the bank withdraws a one-time settlement it had earlier approved, freezes an account, labels the borrower a “wilful defaulter”, or moves to take possession of a mortgaged house. Many people in this position think first of a writ petition in the High Court, because it is seen as a quick and powerful remedy against wrongful action.

Whether the High Court will hear such a petition depends largely on two things: who the bank is, and what exactly the complaint is about. The decided cases suggest that a writ petition against a private bank, such as HDFC Bank, ICICI Bank, Axis Bank, Kotak Mahindra Bank, Yes Bank or IndusInd Bank, will usually be held “not maintainable” where the complaint arises out of a loan or other contract. The position is not absolute. Where a statute or a binding RBI direction places a specific duty on the bank, some High Courts have been willing to intervene. The Allahabad High Court’s ruling against Kotak Mahindra Bank in Proview Constructions (2025) is one example. Much may depend on how the grievance is framed and on the facts of each case. This article explains the basic ideas and then looks at how the Supreme Court and the High Courts, including the Madhya Pradesh High Court, have dealt with petitions against particular banks. It sets out one reading of those cases.

A Few Terms Explained

A “writ petition” is a petition filed directly in a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, asking the court to correct unlawful action. The writ most often sought in banking cases is “mandamus”, an order directing someone to perform a duty that the law places on them, for example to return documents or to decide an application. A petition is called “not maintainable” when the court finds that it should not hear that kind of case at all. The petition is then dismissed without any decision on whether the petitioner is right or wrong, and the petitioner is left to pursue some other remedy. In many High Courts a writ petition is first heard by a single judge (a “Single Judge”), and an appeal may lie to a “Division Bench” of two judges of the same court.

Article 12 of the Constitution defines “the State” for the purposes of fundamental rights. It covers the government and bodies that the government controls. Public sector banks such as the State Bank of India, Punjab National Bank or Bank of Baroda are generally treated as “State”. Private sector banks are companies controlled by private shareholders and management rather than by the government, although public bodies may hold large stakes in some of them. IDBI Bank, for instance, has been classified by the RBI as a private sector bank since 2019, even though the government and LIC together held most of its shares at the time. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) regulates all banks. A “scheduled bank” is a bank listed in the Second Schedule to the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934; most commercial banks, public and private, are scheduled banks.

Two statutes come up often. The SARFAESI Act, 2002 allows banks, financial institutions and certain other lenders to take possession of mortgaged property and sell it to recover a loan, without first filing a suit. A borrower who objects can apply to the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) under Section 17 of that Act, and can then appeal to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) under Section 18, after depositing part of the amount due (the “pre-deposit”: for a borrower, 50 per cent of the debt claimed or determined by the DRT, whichever is less, which the DRAT may reduce to 25 per cent). The Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (often called the RDB Act or the DRT Act) set up the DRTs and governs recovery claims by banks and financial institutions above a threshold amount, currently Rs 20 lakh. Separately, the RBI’s Integrated Ombudsman Scheme, introduced in 2021 to replace the earlier Banking Ombudsman Scheme and also covering NBFCs, allows customers to complain about deficient service without going to court, usually after first complaining to the bank itself. Court orders refer to it variously as the Banking Ombudsman or the RBI Ombudsman.

Why It Matters Whether the Bank Is “State”: Articles 12 and 226

Writs were designed mainly as a check on public power. Article 226, however, allows a High Court to issue writs to “any person or authority”, which is wider than “the State” under Article 12. The Supreme Court has explained how much wider. In Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691, it said that these words are not limited to statutory authorities and government bodies, and “may cover any other person or body performing public duty”. It also set a limit: “If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue.”

Later decisions have built on this. In Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111, a seven-Judge Bench held that a body is “State” under Article 12 only if it is “financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government”, and that this control “must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive”. It added that “when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State”. On this test, being regulated by the government is not the same as being run by it. In Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649, the Constitution Bench held that the BCCI was not “State”, while accepting that a private body exercising public functions might still be reached under Article 226.

On what counts as a “public function”, the Court in Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan, (2005) 6 SCC 657 said that a body performs one “when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public”. It said that the scope of mandamus “is determined by the nature of the duty to be enforced”, and that writ jurisdiction “cannot be exercised to enforce purely private contracts”. In Ramakrishna Mission v. Kago Kunya, (2019) 16 SCC 303, it said that “Regulation by a statute does not constitute the hospital as a body which is constituted under the statute”, and treated contracts of service as private contracts. In St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava, (2023) 4 SCC 498, an appeal from the Madhya Pradesh High Court, it summed up the position: a writ lies against a private body only when it discharges public duties or functions, but “individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element” are not matters for Article 226.

In banking cases, the question is therefore whether a private bank that lends money, recovers a loan or holds a borrower’s property as security is performing a public duty, or is simply carrying out its side of a commercial contract. Most courts that have considered the point have taken the second view.

What the Supreme Court Has Said About Private Banks

Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas (2003)

The leading case is Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, (2003) 10 SCC 733 : AIR 2003 SC 4325, decided by Brijesh Kumar and Arun Kumar, JJ. on 26 September 2003. A branch manager of a private scheduled bank was dismissed from service and filed a writ petition. The Kerala High Court heard it, reasoning that because the RBI regulated the bank, the bank was discharging a public function. The Supreme Court reversed that decision. At paragraph 18, it listed the kinds of bodies against which a writ may ordinarily be issued:

• the State;
• an authority;
• a statutory body;
• an instrumentality or agency of the State;
• a company financed and owned by the State;
• a private body run substantially on State funding;
• a private body discharging a public duty or positive obligation of a public nature; and
• a person or body under a statutory liability to perform a statutory function.

The Court found that a private bank fell into none of these categories. It said that “merely regulatory provisions to ensure such activity carried on by private bodies work within a discipline, do not confer any such status upon the company” (paragraph 32), and that “a private company carrying on banking business as a scheduled bank, cannot be termed as an institution or company carrying on any statutory or public duty” (paragraph 33). Since the dismissed manager was not seeking to enforce any statutory duty of the bank, the petition was held “not maintainable”. The case was about employment rather than a loan, but High Courts have since relied on it widely in loan, security and account disputes.

S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd. (2025)

The Supreme Court returned to the question in S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 INSC 117 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 177, decided by J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ. on 24 January 2025. The petitioner had pledged gold with Muthoot Finance, a non-banking financial company (NBFC), and the High Court had held her writ petition against it not maintainable. The Supreme Court declined to interfere. It said that the company “has no duty towards the public” and that “its functions are also not akin to Governmental functions”.

At paragraph 9, the Court set out eight propositions that High Courts now cite frequently. Among them:

• the RBI’s guidelines “are of regulatory measures to keep a check and provide guideline and not a participatory dominance or control”;
• “a private company carrying on banking business as a Scheduled bank cannot be termed as a company carrying on any public function or public duty”;
• a writ of mandamus may issue to a private body “only where a public duty is cast upon such private body by a statute or statutory rule”; and
• for a public-law remedy, “there must be the public law element”.

The Court stressed that what matters is the function being performed, not the label attached to the body. The petitioner was left to her civil remedies and, as the Court noted, to the RBI Ombudsman.

Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir (2022)

When the dispute is about a loan being recovered, there is often a second objection, separate from the question whether the lender is “State”. In Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir, (2022) 5 SCC 345 (M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ., 12 January 2022), the Karnataka High Court had entertained a borrower’s writ petition against an asset reconstruction company (a company that buys bad loans from banks and financial institutions and tries to recover them) and had kept the recovery on hold for years. The Supreme Court held that a writ petition against a notice under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act (which allows a lender to take possession of the secured property, sell it or take certain other steps) should not have been entertained, because Section 17 provides a remedy before the DRT. It also held that such a company, like a private financial institution, “cannot be said to be performing public functions” when it enforces security in a commercial transaction. In such a case, the Court said, the borrower “has to avail the remedy under the SARFAESI Act and no writ petition would lie”, and filing such petitions “is an abuse of process of the Court”.

A Second Hurdle: The Law Already Provides Another Forum

Even where a writ could in theory be filed, High Courts generally decline to hear one if the law provides another effective remedy. This is a rule of practice rather than an absolute bar, but the Supreme Court has said that it applies with particular force in bank recovery cases, whether the lender is public or private.

In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110, the Court said that the rule “applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions”, and recorded its “serious concern” that High Courts “continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act”. Later decisions took the same line. Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 2 SCC 782 treated an application under Section 17 as an effective remedy even against action under Section 14, where a magistrate helps the lender take possession. Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85 called the SARFAESI Act “a complete code by itself” and disapproved of interim orders granted “for the mere asking”. Agarwal Tracom (P) Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, (2018) 1 SCC 626applied the same approach to an auction purchaser.

Two other decisions involved private banks directly. In ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Umakanta Mohapatra, (2019) 13 SCC 497, the Court set aside orders of the Orissa High Court in writ petitions against ICICI Bank, observing that “despite several judgments of this Court … the High Courts continue to entertain matters which arise under the SARFAESI Act” and that all orders passed in a non-maintainable writ “must perish”. In South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew Philip, (2023) 17 SCC 311, the Court said that “more circumspection is required in a financial transaction, particularly when one of the parties would not come within the purview of Article 12”, which is the position of a private bank.

The Court has also viewed with disfavour writ petitions used to get around statutory conditions. In Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu, (2023) 2 SCC 168, it criticised the “circuitous route” of a writ petition taken to avoid the pre-deposit required for an appeal to the DRAT. In Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) (P) Ltd., (2024) 2 SCC 1 : 2023 INSC 838, it held that the High Court should not have exercised writ jurisdiction when the borrowers had already applied under Section 17. A three-Judge Bench in PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank, 2024 INSC 297 : (2024) 6 SCC 579 “strongly deprecated the practice of entertaining writ petitions in such matters” and imposed costs of Rs 1 lakh on the borrower who had filed the writ petition. It recognised only a limited set of exceptions, drawn from an earlier tax case, Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal. These cover cases where the authority has not acted in accordance with the statute, has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, has relied on repealed provisions, or has passed an order in total violation of natural justice (the basic rules of a fair hearing). More recently, in PNB Housing Finance Ltd. v. Manoj Saha, 2025 INSC 847, the Court noted that it has “repeatedly deprecated interference of High Courts under Article 226/227 in matters pertaining to SARFAESI”.

A similar approach appears in cases about one-time settlements (OTS), where a bank agrees to accept a reduced lump sum to close a loan. In Bijnor Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Meenal Agarwal, (2023) 2 SCC 805, the Court held that “no writ of mandamus can be issued by the High Court … directing a financial institution/bank to positively grant the benefit of OTS”. In State Bank of India v. Arvindra Electronics (P) Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 540, it held that rescheduling a settlement under Article 226 would amount to rewriting the contract. And in Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Narendra Jayantilal Trivedi (order dated 13 May 2022), it vacated an ex parte stay (a stay granted without hearing the bank) given by the Gujarat High Court in a SARFAESI writ petition against Kotak Mahindra Bank, describing the petition as an abuse of process and imposing costs.

Can Article 300A or the “Right of Redemption” Help?

Petitions against private lenders sometimes rely on Article 300A of the Constitution, which says: “No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.” Others rely on the borrower’s “right of redemption”, that is, the right of a person who has mortgaged property to pay off the debt and get the property back. Courts have generally not treated either argument as turning a private dispute into a public-law one.

Article 300A is usually understood as a protection against the State taking property without legal authority. In Vijay Mahobia v. State of M.P., W.P. No. 10187 of 2022, the Gwalior Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that Article 300A cannot be invoked against the action of a private individual, and that a writ does not lie against a private party on that basis. A borrower who has voluntarily mortgaged property to a private lender may therefore find this argument difficult to sustain.

The right of redemption comes from Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The section itself says that “the right conferred by this section is called a right to redeem and a suit to enforce it is called a suit for redemption”, which indicates that the usual way to enforce it is a civil suit. Where the lender has proceeded under the SARFAESI Act, Section 13(8) (as amended in 2016) governs how long the right lasts. In Celir LLP, the Supreme Court held that under the amended provision the right of redemption ends once the auction notice is published, and that Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act gives way to Section 13(8) because of Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act, which gives that Act overriding effect. A borrower who believes redemption was wrongly refused would ordinarily look to a suit for redemption or an application under Section 17, rather than a writ against a private bank.

Bank by Bank: How the Madhya Pradesh High Court and Other High Courts Have Ruled

The cases below show how these principles have been applied to particular lenders. The Madhya Pradesh High Court, and its Gwalior Bench in particular, has followed this approach in a line of orders going back at least to W.P. No. 8074 of 2016 (21 November 2016) and W.A. No. 54 of 2017 (10 February 2017).

Writ Petition Against HDFC Bank

In Neeraj Verma v. Manager, HDFC Cards Division, W.P. No. 9165 of 2025, 2025:MPHC-GWL:8281 (Madhya Pradesh High Court, Gwalior, Division Bench, 9 April 2025), a customer sought a no-dues certificate and compensation in a credit-card dispute. Following Federal Bank and the Gwalior Bench’s earlier orders, the Court held that a writ does not lie against a private bank even if it is under the control of the RBI. It observed that the grievance was essentially that of a consumer, and left the petitioner free to approach the competent authority or the consumer forum.

In H.K. Kalchuri Education Trust v. HDFC Bank Ltd., W.P. No. 12094 of 2025 with W.P. No. 28345 of 2025, 2025:MPHC-JBP:33334 (Jabalpur, Division Bench, 22 July 2025), guarantors complained that fixed deposits of about Rs 48 crore, held by the bank under lien (as security for the loan), had been liquidated against a loan. Relying on Federal Bank and S. Shobha, the Court said that a writ could be entertained only if a violation of a rule or regulation of the RBI were shown. Finding none, it declined to hear the petitions, noting that the Banking Ombudsman, a civil suit and the consumer forum were equally effective remedies. Outside Madhya Pradesh, in Navrathan Jewellers (P) Ltd. v. HDFC Bank Ltd., W.P. No. 8691 of 2022, 2026:KHC:40442 (Karnataka High Court, 3 August 2026), a dispute over pre-closure charges of about Rs 4.83 crore and the release of title deeds was dismissed with liberty (leaving the petitioner free to take other legal steps), the Court holding that private scheduled banks are not public authorities.

Writ Petition Against ICICI Bank

In Chanda Kochhar v. ICICI Bank Ltd. (Bombay High Court, Division Bench, 5 March 2020), a challenge by the bank’s former managing director to its decision to treat her exit as a termination for cause, the Court held that “a writ would not lie to enforce purely private law rights” and that the RBI’s approval under Section 35B of the Banking Regulation Act (under which the RBI’s prior approval is needed for, among other things, ending a managing director’s appointment) “cannot infuse a public law element” into the bank’s decision. In Rajvinder Singh Bedi v. ICICI Bank, CWP No. 3568 of 2025 (Punjab and Haryana High Court, Division Bench, 7 February 2025), a borrower had asked the Court to direct the bank to take possession of and auction the property. The Court declined, holding that ICICI Bank is not “State” and following Phoenix ARC and Federal Bank. The Madras High Court’s decision in ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Lakshminarayanan (Division Bench, 4 January 2008) is also often cited, including in Madhya Pradesh.

Writ Petition Against Axis Bank

In Patwa Abhikaran Ratlam (P) Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India, W.P. No. 20484 of 2024 (Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore, Division Bench, 9 August 2024), a company challenged Axis Bank’s classification of its account as “fraud”. The Court held the petition not maintainable against the private bank, following Federal Bank and W.A. No. 54 of 2017. In S. Rajendran v. Axis Bank, W.P.(MD) No. 16983 of 2022 (Madras High Court, 1 August 2022), a petition about the renewal of a loan was held not maintainable. In Reserve Bank of India v. Society for Welfare of the Handicapped, MAT Nos. 781 and 894 of 2025 (Calcutta High Court, Division Bench, 11 September 2025), the Court held the writ “not maintainable as against Axis Bank” and set aside costs of Rs 25 lakh that a Single Judge had imposed. It also observed that Section 35A of the Banking Regulation Act (the RBI’s power to issue directions to banks) cannot take the place of a civil suit under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the general right to bring a civil suit).

Writ Petition Against Kotak Mahindra Bank

In P. Thangapandian v. Manager, Kotak Mahindra Bank, W.P.(MD) No. 7754 of 2020 (Madras High Court, 23 July 2020), a petition seeking a no-objection certificate for a vehicle loan was dismissed as not maintainable. The Supreme Court’s 2022 order in Narendra Jayantilal Trivedi, mentioned above, also concerned Kotak Mahindra Bank. By contrast, in Proview Constructions (2025), discussed below, the Allahabad High Court issued a writ against Kotak Mahindra Bank in a depositor’s case.

Writ Petition Against IDBI Bank

IDBI Bank shows why it may be worth checking a bank’s status at the time of the dispute. In IDBI Bank Ltd. v. Shyam Manohar Pachori, W.A. No. 1988 of 2026, 2026:MPHC-JBP:47594 (Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur, Division Bench, 2 July 2026), a Single Judge had quashed the bank’s withdrawal of a one-time settlement and stayed recovery proceedings before the DRT. On appeal, the Division Bench noted that the RBI has classified IDBI Bank as a private sector bank since 21 January 2019. It framed the question as “whether a writ can be issued against the private Bank”, answered it in the negative on the basis of paragraph 9 of S. Shobha, set aside the Single Judge’s order, and left the borrower to the DRT, the RBI Ombudsman or a civil suit. Earlier, in Unimoni Financial Services Ltd. v. IDBI Bank Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 7347 (16 December 2020), the Kerala High Court held that a demand for processing fees and the retention of title deeds as security involved no element of public duty, even if the bank were treated as a public sector bank.

Writ Petition Against IndusInd Bank and Yes Bank

In Lalita Bai Tiwari v. IndusInd Bank, W.P. No. 8854 of 2022 (Madhya Pradesh High Court, 18 July 2022), which concerned the seizure of trucks, the Court held that regulation by the RBI does not mean that a private bank discharges a public function. The Karnataka High Court took a similar view in Sharmila G.S. v. IndusInd Bank Ltd., W.A. No. 1146 of 2021 (Division Bench, 6 December 2021), applying paragraph 33 of Federal Bank. In Universal Hospital Al Ain LLC v. Yes Bank Ltd., SCA No. 16268 of 2020 (Gujarat High Court, 13 July 2022), a challenge to a show-cause notice proposing to declare the petitioner a wilful defaulter (broadly, a borrower who defaults despite being able to pay, or who misuses the loan) was dismissed. The Court held that a shareholding of about 35% by SBI and LIC did not make Yes Bank “State”, applying Federal Bank and Phoenix ARC.

Small Finance Banks: Ujjivan and AU Small Finance Bank

In Jyoti Tomar v. State of M.P., W.P. No. 10761 of 2022 (Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore, Division Bench, 9 February 2023), a property owner challenged a demand notice issued by Ujjivan Small Finance Bank after first complaining to the Banking Ombudsman. The petition was dismissed as not maintainable, relying on Federal Bank, Phoenix ARC and the Madras High Court’s decision in Lakshminarayanan. In Shashi Sharma v. State of M.P., W.A. No. 2543 of 2025, 2025:MPHC-JBP:58167 (Jabalpur, Division Bench, 17 November 2025), a dispute over the seizure of a vehicle by AU Small Finance Bank, the Court held that a writ is not maintainable against a private entity despite the regulatory framework, and left civil remedies open. In AU Small Finance Bank Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India, D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 532 of 2025 (Rajasthan High Court, Division Bench, 19 May 2025), the Court sent the borrower to the DRT, observing that the DRT can itself examine whether RBI directions were followed.

IDFC First Bank and Bandhan Bank: Employment and Disciplinary Matters

In Vikram Singh v. IDFC First Bank, W.P. No. 3698 of 2026, 2026:MPHC-GWL:5921 (Madhya Pradesh High Court, Gwalior, 13 February 2026), a former relationship manager sought a relieving letter and compensation. The petition was dismissed at the admission stage on the basis of paragraphs 27 and 33 of Federal Bank, the Court noting that the only exception is where the bank fails to comply with a statutory provision binding on it. In Ravindra Pandey v. Head, Disciplinary Management Department, Bandhan Bank, Writ-A No. 6198 of 2026, 2026:AHC:96343 (Allahabad High Court, 29 April 2026), a writ against Bandhan Bank, apparently arising from a disciplinary matter, was dismissed in a short order as not maintainable against a private bank.

South Indian Bank and Karnataka Bank

In Authorised Officer, South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Sheela Francis Parakkal, W.A. No. 1498 of 2025, 2025:KER:63425(Kerala High Court, Division Bench, 22 August 2025), a Single Judge had granted a declaration and costs against the bank for keeping title deeds after the loan was closed. The Division Bench set that order aside, holding that private banks are not “State”. In B. Prakash Rao v. Karnataka Bank Ltd., W.P. No. 20684 of 2011 (Madras High Court, 30 April 2024), the writ petition was dismissed applying St. Mary’s Education Society and Federal Bank.

NBFCs and Housing Finance Companies

For non-banking financial companies, S. Shobha (Muthoot Finance) is the leading authority. In Supertech Urban Home Buyers Association v. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 9491 of 2020, 2023:DHC:1872 (Delhi High Court, 14 March 2023), home buyers’ claims against Indiabulls, HDFC Ltd., PNB Housing Finance, ICICI and other lenders under subvention schemes (arrangements under which the builder was to pay the interest, or in some cases the instalments, on the buyers’ home loans for an agreed period, typically until possession) were held to arise from private contracts. The Court also held that an alleged breach of RBI circulars would not by itself entitle the petitioners to relief under Article 226.

What About Public Sector Banks Such as SBI and PNB?

Public sector banks, including the State Bank of India, Punjab National Bank, Bank of Baroda and other nationalised banks, are generally treated as “State”, so a writ can in principle be filed against them. In loan disputes, however, the result has often been similar. Many of the Supreme Court decisions discussed above, in which writ petitions failed on alternative-remedy or contractual grounds, involved public sector lenders: Satyawati Tondon (United Bank of India), Mathew K.C. (State Bank of Travancore), Agarwal Tracom (Punjab National Bank), Varimadugu Obi Reddy (State Bank of India), PHR Invent (UCO Bank), Celir LLP (Union Bank of India) and Arvindra Electronics (State Bank of India).

High Courts have taken the same approach. In Classic Agencies v. Indian Overseas Bank, W.A. No. 2095 of 2025, 2025:KER:65717 (Kerala High Court, Division Bench, 27 August 2025), a request to direct the bank to extend a one-time settlement was refused because it would amount to “rewriting the contract, which is not permissible while exercising the powers under Article 226”. In Babita Vishnoi v. Bank of Baroda, LPA No. 114 of 2025 (Delhi High Court, Division Bench, 17 February 2025), the Court held that difficulty in making the pre-deposit was not a reason to bypass the appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. The difference between public and private banks may therefore matter less than borrowers expect. Against a public sector bank, a writ in a loan dispute usually faces the alternative-remedy and contract objections. Against a private bank, it faces those objections and, in addition, the question whether the bank is subject to writ jurisdiction at all.

When a Writ Against a Private Bank May Still Be Possible

A private bank can still be a respondent in a writ petition in some situations. Federal Bank itself recognised that a private body discharging a public duty, or under a statutory obligation to perform a statutory function, may be subject to writ jurisdiction. S. Shobha (paragraph 9(5)) likewise accepts that mandamus may issue to a private body “where a public duty is cast upon such private body by a statute or statutory rule”. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has described the exception in similar terms: a writ may be entertained against a private bank where a violation of a specific statutory provision or binding RBI direction is pleaded and shown (H.K. Kalchuri, paragraph 24; Vikram Singh, paragraph 11). General appeals to Article 300A, the right of redemption, fairness or hardship have not usually been treated as enough.

Three recent decisions illustrate where the line may fall. In Proview Constructions Ltd. v. Union of India, Writ-C No. 28679 of 2024, 2025:AHC:20822-DB (Allahabad High Court, Division Bench, 13 February 2025), Kotak Mahindra Bank had frozen a depositor’s current account at the instance of a relative. The Court allowed the writ petition. It held that a bank’s duty to repay its depositors flows from the conditions of its licence under the Banking Regulation Act and “lies in the realm of public function”, and it distinguished Federal Bank as an employment case and S. Shobha as an NBFC case. In Ajay Vijh v. Indian Banks’ Association, 2026 INSC 670 (Supreme Court, 7 July 2026), a writ was held maintainable against the Indian Banks’ Association, a body that the Court accepted “may not strictly be State”, because its “Caution List” operated across the banking industry as an adverse accreditation mechanism with a public-law character. The Court applied the function test from Andi Mukta, Zee Telefilms and S. Shobha. And in Umri Pooph Pratappur Tollways (P) Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation, 2025 INSC 907, the Court repeated that a writ lies in a contractual matter only where “the dispute involves a public law element rather than being confined to the realm of private contractual obligations”.

These cases do not appear to displace the general rule. They suggest that the court looks at the specific act complained of and asks whether it involves a public duty. Ordinary decisions to lend, recover, enforce security, classify an account or decline a settlement have usually been treated as commercial. Whether a particular grievance falls on the public side of the line can be a matter of argument, and courts have not always agreed.

Two further points may be relevant. First, where the challenge is to the RBI’s own directions, or to the RBI’s failure to act, a writ against the Reserve Bank may be maintainable, and the High Court may allow the regulator’s own enquiry to proceed while declining relief against the private bank, as the Calcutta High Court did in Society for Welfare of the Handicapped. Second, on wilful-defaulter and fraud classification, the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. Jah Developers (P) Ltd., (2019) 6 SCC 787 and State Bank of India v. Rajesh Agarwal, (2023) 6 SCC 1 treated the RBI’s Master Directions (consolidated binding instructions issued by the RBI) as having statutory force and read in a right to be heard. Those were public sector bank cases. Some High Courts have entertained such challenges whatever the ownership of the bank, while the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Patwa Abhikaran, Axis Bank) and the Gujarat High Court (Universal Hospital, Yes Bank) declined to do so against private banks.

Where Else a Borrower Can Go

Courts that have declined writs against private banks have usually pointed to other remedies:

• For action under the SARFAESI Act, such as a possession notice or an auction: an application to the DRT under Section 17 (generally within 45 days of the measure complained of), followed by an appeal to the DRAT under Section 18, subject to pre-deposit.
• For disputes about the debt itself: defending, and counter-claiming in, the bank’s recovery case before the DRT under the RDB Act or, where those statutes do not apply, a civil suit for redemption, declaration, injunction or damages.
• For complaints about service, charges, documents or conduct: the RBI’s Integrated Ombudsman Scheme ( Shobha, IDBI Bank v. Pachori, H.K. Kalchuri) or the consumer forum (Neeraj Verma, H.K. Kalchuri).
• Where the loan agreement contains an arbitration clause: arbitration ( Shobha).

Conclusion

On the cases discussed here, a writ petition against a private bank over a loan, a mortgage or a settlement is likely to face serious difficulty. Federal Bank v. Sagar Thomas, restated in S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance in 2025, holds that a private bank is not the State and that RBI regulation alone does not make its lending a public function. Phoenix ARC, Satyawati Tondon, Naveen Mathew Philip and PHR Invent require that loan recovery disputes, except in limited cases, go to the remedies provided by the SARFAESI Act and the RDB Act.

The exception is nonetheless a real one. Where a statute or a binding RBI direction places a specific duty on the bank and the complaint is about a breach of that duty, the outcome may be different, as Proview Constructions shows; and Ajay Vijh suggests that even a body that is not strictly “State” can be reached where the act complained of has a public character. Where exactly the line falls in a given case often depends on careful pleading and on the court’s view of the facts, and the position may continue to develop.

This article is for general information only and is not legal advice. The position may vary with the facts of a case and with later decisions; readers should consult counsel on their particular situation.

Link to similar articles: https://jpassociates.co.in/breach-of-an-undertaking-contempt/