Case Comment: Cryogas Equipment Private Limited V. Inox India Limited And Others
The Indian Intellectual Property law framework clearly demarcates the boundaries of Copyright and Designs, with each having its own statutory framework: the Copyright Act 1957 and the Designs Act 2000, respectively.
In this particular case, without going needlessly into the facts of the matter, the respondents alleged copyright infringement by the appellants in their Proprietary Engineering Drawings (PEDs) and in the details, processes, descriptions, and narrations involved in creating those engineering drawings, that is, literary works. These two-dimensional PEDs are then converted into articles of commerce to be used in industrial processes.
In the Copyright Act, under Section 15(2)[2], an artistic creation, when applied to an industrial process and through which, if more than fifty copies are produced, then the work’s copyright protection is lost. The crux of the dispute lies not merely in eligibility but in the duration of protection.
While the Designs Act caps protection at fifteen[3] years, the Copyright Act extends it for the author’s lifetime plus sixty years[4], choosing regime a matter of significant legal and commercial consequence. Apart from the mentioned contentions, the appellants argued that the industrial usage of these drawings, i.e., Cryogenic Storage Tanks, particularly the inner vessel of the LNG Semi-trailer, lacks visual appeal, and hence is not capable of registration under section 2(d)[5] of the Designs Act[6].
In contrast, the respondents argued that the suit involved two distinct copyrighted works, i.e., Proprietary Engineering Drawings and literary works. Subsequently, it was contended that the former falls under the definition of artistic work defined in section 2(c)[7] of the Copyright Act.
The Devised Two-pronged Solution:-
Through multiple judgments of various High Courts and prior precedents, the Supreme Court arrived at its two-pronged test, which encompasses the following parameters to judge whether the said artistic work qualifies for copyright protection or falls under the Designs Act for protection. In the court’s own words(Para 60):-
This test shall consider:
- whether the work in question is purely an ‘artistic work’ entitled to protection under the Copyright Act or whether it is a ‘design’ derived from such original artistic work and subjected to an industrial process based upon the language in Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act;
- If such a work does not qualify for copyright protection, then the test of ‘functional utility’ will have to be applied to determine its dominant purpose, and then ascertain whether it would qualify for design protection under the Designs Act.[8]
The first prong was to test whether the work was created purely for artistic purposes or meant for any industrial usage. In the former case, copyright protection continues unless the work is capable of registration under the Designs Act and is reproduced more than fifty times through an industrial process without design registration. In the latter one, to protect the work, it has to be registered under the Designs Act, and simultaneous claims in both cannot be sustained.
Here, it is imperative to understand that Technical drawings like PEDs are quite distinct in their nature compared to other artistic works. These are not the final embodiment of an article of commerce, but instead, they are meant to be reproduced in an industrial product.
For the first parameter, the Court, while attempting to simplify the issue, appears to adopt an approach that presupposes the distinction between an artistic work and a design. It presupposes the very answer it claims to provide.
To apply the test, one must already know whether the work is an artistic work or a design, which is precisely the question the test was meant to resolve[9]. Along with this, the question of law in this particular case was not to determine how the interplay of the Copyright Act and the Designs Act governs the artistic works at different stages; instead, it was narrowly confined to whether the commercial court’s decision to reject the plaint at the Order VII Rule 11[10] stage was valid or not[11].
The court, instead of being confined just to the framed questions of law, went beyond the immediate dispute to formulate a broader framework to test all future cases in this context. Though the Supreme Court has such powers to do so, and the requirement of such a ruling was also persistently felt due to multiple different judgments on the issue across jurisdictions, this case may not have been the most suitable vehicle through which such principles ought to have been authoritatively settled.
For the second parameter, when the artistic work does not fall under copyright protection, the test of functional utility (developed through multiple cases) is applied to ascertain its dominant purpose(undefined throughout the judgment) to validate whether it would qualify for design protection under the Designs Act.
The functional utility test has been applied across multiple jurisdictions, and one of the earliest cases employing such an approach (though not using the term “conceptual separability” explicitly) to identify functional utility separated from artistic expression was Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 74 S. Ct. 460, 98 L. Ed. 630 (1954).[12]
Also, the proposition of dominant purpose /functional utility raises serious questions. By inquiring into the dominant purpose of the design, it overlooks the fact that the purpose of design law is not to protect the product as a whole, but to recognise the aesthetic appeal of a specific feature to the eye, as stated in section 2(d) of the Designs Act.
By introducing another layer of subjectivity, i.e., the determination of what qualifies as functional utility of the article or of any constituent part thereof, this also introduces an additional layer of uncertainty in the already intensely subjective area of law. Even after correctly determining the functional utility, the dominant purpose still may differ when viewed from different perspectives.
The Clash Of Titans:-
The two titans here are Section 15(2) and Section 52(1)(w)[13] of the Copyright Act, and their clash is bound to happen when it comes to technical drawings meant for industrial processes. Though Section 52(1)(w) was not used in any manner during the entire proceedings, yet from its purview, the protection sought under the Copyright Act for artistic creations also falling under the Designs Act could be saved, given that such industrial use pertains to a functional part of a useful device.
Through this provision, the operation of Section 15(2) may arguably have been limited in certain circumstances, and the copyright protection would have continued to apply, resulting in a successful infringement suit against the appellant. One possible reason why this argument was not advanced may be that it was not clear whether the industrial use of those PEDs( i.e., Cryogenic Storage Tanks) pertains to a functional part of a useful device or a useful device altogether.
Nevertheless, this proposition has been established time and again through multiple judgments. In Rochem Separation Systems (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Nirtech Pvt. Ltd (2023)[15], the Bombay High Court held that this section “ prevents misuse of copyright law to claim monopoly over functional industrial components”.[16]
Here, it is pertinent to highlight that engineering drawings may qualify as artistic works under section 2(c) of the Copyright Act and may therefore fall outside the scope of ‘design’ under section 2(d) of the Designs Act. A purely functional three-dimensional reproduction derived from a two-dimensional engineering drawing may not qualify for design registration because such reproductions result in “mere mechanical devices” under the same section, but qualify for protection under section 14(1)(c)[17]of the Copyright Act.[18]
Another critical aspect of section 52(1)(w) of the Copyright Act, when read with section 14(1)(c) of the same Act, reveals a degree of doctrinal tension when applied in this context, as the former grants the exemption to producing a three-dimensional object from a two-dimensional artistic work, whereas the latter only allows such reproductions after taking due permission.
Conclusion:-
Through this case, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to resolve several longstanding doctrinal ambiguities in the interplay of the Copyright Act and the Designs Act, but several aspects were left unaddressed. Nevertheless, the Court formulated a two-pronged test along with functional utility, which has already been considered as an established international practice.
This also affirms the principle that for different intellectual properties, one must find the most appropriate statutory framework and should not circumvent the process. The approach taken by the apex court in directing the commercial court to conduct the retrial affirms its balanced approach towards these complex issues.
This judgment cautions creators and commercial entities to apply for the design registration for their artistic creations with visual appeal and future mass production possibility, as otherwise, the copyright protection may cease under Section 15(2). It remains to be seen whether the questions raised by this judgment will attain greater doctrinal certainty in future litigation at the end of the day.
Despite shortcomings, the judgment laid down important fundamental principles in relation to both statutes. The longstanding tension between the Copyright Act and the Designs Act has, perhaps for the first time, shown signs of easing, and this is a positive thing for the Indian IPR framework.
Author Details: Mr. Ojas Rai, Soon To Be A Student Of B.A. Ll.B. (Hons.) At National Law School Of India University, Bengaluru
References:-
[1]:- See, Microfibres Inc v. Girdhar (2006 SCC OnLine Del 60), Dart Industries Inc and another v. Techno Plast and others (2007 SCC OnLine Del 892), PrandaJewelryPvt. Ltd. v. Aarya 24 KT (2015 SCC OnLine Bom 958)
[2]:- https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1018906/
[3]:- https://jpassociates.co.in/copyright-protection-for-design/
[4]:- https://lawbhoomi.com/duration-of-copyright-in-india/
[5]:- https://indiankanoon.org/doc/618466/
[6]:- https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/cryogas-equipment-private-limited-vs-inox-india-slp-280622024-shaikh-guhbf/
[7]:- https://indiankanoon.org/doc/121334999/
[8]:-Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others(2025 INSC 483)¶ 60
[9]:- https://repository.nls.ac.in/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1619&context=ijlt
[10]:- https://www.writinglaw.com/order-7-rule-11-cpc/
[11]:-https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c65ca77b-d821-451e-a669-89306a9bb408
[12]:- Cryogas Equipment Private Limited (supra),¶ 41
[13]:- https://indiankanoon.org/doc/257434/
[14]:- https://spicyip.com/2025/04/part-i-cryogas-judgment-supreme-court-stops-copyright-from-gaslighting-design.html
[15]:- https://indiankanoon.org/doc/139407183/
[16]:- https://spicyip.com/2025/04/assessing-the-cryogas-judgment-from-the-lens-of-section-521w.html
[17]:- https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1129646/
[18]:- https://spicyip.com/2017/08/the-delhi-high-court-misses-another-opportunity-to-rule-on-the-new-section-521w-in-context-of-engineering-drawings.html